# THE GLOBAL WAR ON TERRORISM OPERATION IRAQI FREEDOM

# 362ND QUARTERMASTER BATTALION (PETROLEUM SUPPLY)

(Kinston, North Carolina) 25 January 2003-2 February 2004



Office of Army Reserve History
United States Army Reserve Command
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
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**Kathryn Roe Coker** 

Lee S. Harford, Jr. Editor





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2007



DESCRIPTION: On a dark blue disk the bust of a Minuteman (Captain John Parker) in cocked hat on a pedestal, between two branches of olive or within a dark blue designation band with gold inner and outer borders inscribed UNITED STATES ARMY RESERVE in gold.

SYMBOLISM: The minuteman has traditionally been used to represent the citizen soldier. The wreath signifies achievement and accomplishment. Gold is symbolic of honor and excellence and dark blue signifies loyalty.

BACKGROUND: The emblem was approved for use as a plaque in 1972 and is used as an unofficial identification device of the United States Army Reserve. (US Army Institute of Heraldry.)

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Copies can be obtained from the Office of Army Reserve History United States Army Reserve Command (USARC)

### **Foreword**

The Global War on Terrorism-Operation Iraqi Freedom: 362nd Quartermaster Battalion is the first in a series of histories of Army Reserve units deployed in the Global War on Terrorism (GWOT). This includes Operations Noble Eagle, Enduring Freedom, and Iraqi Freedom. The histories are based on primary sources collected by the Office of Army Reserve History's GWOT Military History Task Force. The task force provides program management, central collection, and archiving of unit histories. The former Chief, Army Reserve Lieutenant General James Helmly, stated the importance of this collection effort:

The Army Reserve is experiencing a time of great transition to meet present and future challenges to our national security. The events of this transition, while still fresh, must be captured and documented to preserve the story of the Army Reserve's contribution to this unprecedented war. The result will be a unique archive of the wartime accomplishments of all mobilized Army Reserve units, not only of this war, but for all future defense commitments. Nowhere else within the United States Government does an official archive of the Army Reserve exist.

The records collected include narratives with a mission statement, after action reviews or lessons learned, personnel rosters, mobilization orders, demobilization orders, unit briefing slides, photographs, and autobiographical sketches. This information is used to record and to preserve the Army Reserve's contributions to GWOT. This volume and other unit histories included in the series, as compiled from these records, provide an invaluable resource for the Army Reserve and its Soldiers to

learn from their own experiences and retain lessons learned for future operations.

Fort McPherson Atlanta, Georgia March 2007 LEE S. HARFORD, JR., Ph.D. Army Reserve Historian United States Army Reserve

### Introduction

"Through their service, Reserve personnel play an important role in our efforts to advance democracy, peace and freedom across the Nation and around the world. These dedicated men and women train vigorously and work closely with our active duty forces, serving as equal partners in our integrated Armed Forces." President George W. Bush (11/08/02)<sup>1</sup>

States. The terrorist attacks had a profound affect on the country. In his address to the nation that night, President George W. Bush said the attacks had moved "a great people . . . to defend a great nation." Bush set the tone for his evolving doctrine by stating the US "will make no distinction between terrorists who committed these acts and those who harbor them." On 20 September 2001 in a joint session of Congress, Bush further defined his policy by stating, "Either you are with us, or you are with the terrorists. From this day forward, any nation that continues to harbor or support terrorism will be regarded by the United States as a hostile regime."

In just three days after the attacks of 11 September, President Bush ordered a partial mobilization with the first call-ups starting on 22 September. The Army Reserve quickly reacted to the largest deployment since Operation Desert Storm. Even before the official call-ups, eighty-five Soldiers from one Army Reserve unit, the 311th Quartermaster Company (Mortuary Affairs), were on the scene at the Pentagon by 17 September 2001.<sup>3</sup>

<sup>1</sup> Article, "Notable Quotables," Army Reserve Magazine, Volume 49, Number 1, 03, p. 6.

http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2001/09/2001/09/20010911-16.html.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>2</sup> Statement, President George W. Bush, Statement by the President in His Address to the Nation, 11 Sep 01,

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>3</sup> Testimony, Lieutenant General Thomas Plewes, "Army Reserve Overview," Statement Before the Subcommittee on Personnel, Committee on Armed Services, US Senate, 13 Feb 02; Article, Linda Kozaryn, "Army Reserve Duty Has 'Changed Forever," 22 Jan 02, <a href="https://isarcintra/CdrsCorner/ArmyResDutycgmsg.htm">https://isarcintra/CdrsCorner/ArmyResDutycgmsg.htm</a>; and Email, Sergeant First Class

In New York after the attack on the World Trade Center, Army Reserve Soldiers aided in the recovery efforts. Emergency Preparedness Liaison Officers were quick to answer the call for assistance. Army Reserve Soldiers provided equipment, reserve center space, and other logistical support. Like the Pentagon recovery effort the actions of Army Reserve Soldiers at the World Trade Center preceded official mobilization.<sup>4</sup>

Military intelligence determined that Osama bin Laden's Islamic al Qaeda was responsible for the 11 September attacks. Al Qaeda's base of operations was in Afghanistan where the fundamentalist Taliban regime controlled the country and harbored al Qaeda. A loose coalition, the Northern Alliance, opposed the Taliban. On 7 October 2001, less than a month after the 11 September attacks, the US, with support from Great Britain, launched an air and naval attack as part of Operation Enduring Freedom. The campaign pinpointed airfields and air defenses along with command and control centers. In a national address Bush said the military action was aimed to "cut the military capability of the Taliban regime." Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld explained that the assault was intended to "make it increasingly difficult for terrorists to use Afghanistan as a base of operations."

The ground war or "boots on the ground" began on 19 October 2001 with a number of twelve-man Special Forces Operational

Christina Steiner with attached article, Gina Cavallaro, *Times* "Army Reserve deploys greater percentage of soldiers," 19 Mar 03.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>4</sup> Testimony, Statement of Lieutenant General James Helmly Before the Subcommittee On Defense, Committee on Appropriations, US Senate, National Guard and Reserve Programs, 7 May 03.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>5</sup>Coordinating Draft, Brigadier General John S. Brown, *American Military History* (Washington, DC: US Army Center of Military History, 26 Nov 03), chapter 29, p. 8; Pamphlet, Dr. Richard Stewart, *The United States Army in Afghanistan: Operation Enduring Freedom, October 2001-March 2002* (Washington, DC: US Army Center of Military History, no date), p. 7; Article, author unknown, "Afghanistan wakes after night of intense bombings," 7 Oct 2001,

http://archives.cnn.com/2001/US/10/07gen.america.under attack/index, html.; and Article, author unknown, no date, "Defense officials Air Operations to last several days," http://archives.cnn.com/2001/US/1007/ret.attack.pentagon/.

Detachment A teams who joined the Northern Alliance in fighting the Taliban and al Qaeda. By November 2001 over 50,000 American forces involving ground, sea, and air operations were in the theater. fighting in Afghanistan," wrote Brigadier General John Brown, director of the US Army Center of Military History, "fractured into several miniature campaigns as each allied Afghan warlord advanced on his own objectives, carefully protecting the tiny contingent of Americans who gave him . . . awesome firepower.",6 The fall of Kabul and Kandahar and the "destruction of organized resistance in Tora Bora" spelled doom for the terrorists. By late 2001, American Soldiers working with Afghan forces were successful in "decisive[1]y defeating the Taliban and their al Qaeda allies and in liberating Afghanistan."<sup>7</sup> Operation Enduring Freedom "marked the first commitment of American forces in what would become simultaneous combat operations across multiple theaters of war since World War II."8

In his state of the union address on 29 January 2002, President Bush told the American people "in four short months," the country had "rallied a great coalition, captured, arrested, and rid the world of thousands of terrorists, destroyed Afghanistan's terrorist training camps, saved a people from starvation, and freed a country from brutal oppression."

But, as seen later the terrorists rallied, albeit in a weakened state. By January 2002, the US and its allies began to set the stage for Operation Anaconda which lasted from 2 March through 19 March 2002. Its mission was to destroy remaining al Qaeda forces. Although the operation was successful, a number of al Qaeda fled into the nearby mountains and into Pakistan. While the terrorists suffered substantial losses, fighting still

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>6</sup> Coordinating Draft, Brown, *American Military History*, chapter 29, pp. 10-12 and Pamphlet, Stewart, *The United States Army in Afghanistan*, p. 10.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>7</sup> Pamphlet, Stewart, *The United States Army in Afghanistan*, pp.27, 45.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>8</sup>Fontenot, et al, US Army in Operation Iraqi Freedom, p. 24.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>9</sup> Address, President George Bush, "President Delivers State of the Union Address," no date, <a href="http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2002/02/200020129-11.html">http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2002/02/200020129-11.html</a>.

persists in Afghanistan.<sup>10</sup> Operation Enduring Freedom continues as does the mobilization of Army Reserve Soldiers.

The Army Reserve played and is playing a vital role in these operations. According to Lieutenant General James Helmly, Chief, Army Reserve, "What was once a force in reserve has become a full partner across the spectrum of operations to satisfy the demand and need for Army Reserve Soldiers and units around the world. Wherever the Army committed forces in the world . . . Army Reserve Soldiers are an integral part, providing critical specialized capabilities and augmentation."

Army Reserve Soldiers were there in Afghanistan serving alongside active component Soldiers. For example, the 911th Forward Surgical Team supported the 10th Mountain Division during medical assistance missions in Afghanistan. The 310th Psychological Operations Battalion served in the isolated mountain regions of Afghanistan determining the needs of the people and organizing the delivery of non-perishable food, bottled water, and medical aid. The 345th Military Intelligence Detachment assisted the Coalition Forces Land Component Command (CFLCC) in intelligence operations leading to the identification, location and targeting of the Taliban and al Qaeda. What Army Reserve Soldiers accomplished proved "vital to the war on terrorism." "We," said one Soldier, "helped out the active duty forces that

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<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>10</sup> Coordinating Draft, Brown, *American Military History*, chapter 29, pp. 9-17; Pamphlet, Stewart, *The United States Army in Afghanistan*, pp. 30, 44-45; and News Story, Joe Burlas, subject: Shinseki pins on medals on Anaconda heroes, 10 Apr 02. Also see Charles Briscoe, Richard Kiper, James Schroder, and Kalev Sepp, *Weapons of Choice: US Army Special Operations Forces in Afghanistan* (Fort Leavenworth, Kansas: Combat Studies Institute, 03).

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>11</sup>Testimony, Statement of Lieutenant General James Helmly Before the Subcommittee On Defense, Committee on Appropriations, US Senate, National Guard and Reserve Programs, 7 May 03.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>12</sup> News Release, Lieutenant General James Helmly, "The Army Reserve Engaged in the Global War on Terrorism," Apr 04, <a href="http://ww4.army.mil/USAR/news/word-01.php">http://ww4.army.mil/USAR/news/word-01.php</a>; Photo caption, "Cpl. Dominic M. Pileri, *Army Reserve Magazine*, Volume 49, Number 1, 03, p. 27; and Article, no author, "Units That Serve," *Army Reserve Magazine*, Volume 49, Number 1, 03, p. 18.

were there and needed the augmentation." Some civil affairs units, known for their distribution of humanitarian aid and assisting in rebuilding projects, found themselves on the front lines working on combat operations with the infantrymen. In fighting terrorists there often was no clearly defined front line.

The concept for what later became Operation Iraqi Freedom was long in the making dating back some viewed to 1 March 1991, the day after Desert Storm. Based on intelligence that Saddam Hussein had developed weapons of mass destruction President Bush decided that a regime change in Iraq was warranted. He also based his decision on Iraq's probable connection with terrorists and the belief that Iraq posed a danger to the stability of the Middle East. As some of America's allies questioned the threat of Saddam, Bush was prepared to act alone to crush what he included in his "axis of evil." Others wanted to wait on the results of recently readmitted UN weapons inspectors. Britain sided with Bush as his determination for a regime change in Iraq increased. In a statement to the United Nations General Assembly on 10 September 2002, Bush said:

My nation will work with the UN Security Council to meet our common challenge. If Iraq's regime defies us again, the world must move deliberately, decisively to hold Iraq to account. We will work with the UN Security Council for the necessary resolutions. But the purposes of the United States should not be doubted. The Security Council resolutions will be enforced -- the just demands of peace and security will be met -- or action will be unavoidable. And a regime that has lost its legitimacy will also lose its power. 15

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<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>13</sup>Article, no author, "The Units That Serve," *Army Reserve Magazine*, Volume 49, Number 1, 03, pp. 19-20 and Photograph, *New York Newsday*, 8 Feb 02, <a href="http://www.neynesday.com">http://www.neynesday.com</a>.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>14</sup> Fontenot, et al, US *Army Operations in Iraqi Freedom*, p. xxii and Coordinating Draft, Brown, *American Military History*, chapter 29, p. 27.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>15</sup>Address, President George Bush, President's Remarks at the United Nations General Assembly, 10 Sep 02, <a href="http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2002/09/20020912-1.html">http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2002/09/20020912-1.html</a>.

Seven days later on 17 September 2002, Bush released his administration's National Security Strategy which, in short, set forth the reformulation and posture of America's foreign policy. It was a major shift from a "shape, respond, prepare" posture to the new posture of "assure, dissuade, deter forward, and decisively defeat." It affected how the Army was to reshape itself and went hand in hand with the Army's ongoing transformation. The new posture included preemption to handle rogue states and terrorists with weapons of mass destruction. As Bush said, this was "a matter of common sense and self defense." It would set the stage in 2003 for the invasion of Iraq.

When Bush made this address to the UN plans were already in the making for a campaign against Iraq. In fact on 4 December 2001 General Tommy Franks, commander of the US Central Command (CENTCOM), briefed the secretary of defense on the first draft war plan. By 1 February 2002, Franks had plans for a four-phased war involving deployment of troops into theater, air strikes, a ground war, and reconstruction.<sup>17</sup>

On the eve of the campaign, the Turkish parliament decided not to allow the 4th Mechanized Infantry Division to pass through the country and thereby set up a front in northern Iraq. "This obviated a major feature of the preferred war plan, left the division's equipment out of play as it hastily transshipped from standing offshore from Turkey to Kuwait, and perturbated deployment schedules because the ships carrying the 4th

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<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>16</sup> Statement, *The National Security Strategy of the United State of America*, 17 Sep 02; Article, anonymous, subject: "Chronology: The Evolution of the Bush Doctrine," no date, <a href="http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/iraq/etc/cron.html">http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/iraq/etc/cron.html</a>; Article, anonymous, "Chronology," no date,

http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/lonroad/etc/cron.html; and Colonel Gregory Fontenot, Lieutenant Colonel E.J. Degan and Lieutenant Colonel David Tohn, US *Army in Operation Iraqi Freedom: ON POINT* (Fort Leavenworth, Kansas: Combat Studies Institute, 04), p. 23.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>17</sup>Study, Lieutenant Colonel Paul Pierett, subject: Outline of Mobilization-Draft, p.1, 21 Jan 05 and General Tommy Franks, *American Soldier* (Harper Collins: New York, 04), p. 366.

Mechanized Infantry Division equipment were not available for other purposes for a prolonged period of time."

Franks and the ground forces commander, Lieutenant General David McKiernan, had to reassess their strategy in the light of the impending conflict. Franks had several contingency plans. One called for a "rolling start." According to this plan, the campaign would begin by using forces already in theater and supplementing them as needed with "reinforcements as they arrived. Iraqi dispositions and circumstances," wrote Brown, "did not suggest significant resistance much south of Baghdad, so why not sweep up relatively uncontested terrain with a lesser force and feed in further forces as they arrived?" The plan was tactically driven given a twelve-year air campaign dating from Desert Storm with the no fly zones, American ground forces "acclimatized for operations in Iraq" with experienced defensive operations protecting Kuwait, and intelligence reportedly pinpointing Saddam's location. <sup>19</sup>

Operation Iraqi Freedom began with an air assault on 19 March 2003 in the "shock and awe" phase. Within twenty-four hours the 3rd Mechanized Infantry Division, 1st Marine Division, and the British 7 Armored Division were on the move. They quickly traversed the theater without much opposition, moving along the west side of the Euphrates River toward Baghdad, reaching the vicinity of Al Najaf with minimal resistance, overrunning the Rumaila oil fields and securing the facilities "virtually unscathed," capturing Umm Qasr and mounting other offensive operations. Western and northern Iraq had virtually been neutralized.<sup>20</sup>

However, "the campaign did not stay easy." The Fedayeen, Special Republican Guards, and other forces mounted a counterattack "with a vengeance." They proved to be "wily and ruthless opponents," ambushing US forces, sniping, attacking the extended supply lines, firing shoulder air defense weapons, and using suicidal tactics. "They knew the American rules of engagement and exploited them to their advantage."

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>18</sup>Coordinating Draft, Brown, American Military History, chapter 29, pp. 27-29.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>19</sup> Ibid, pp. 29-30.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>20</sup> Ibid, p. 31 and Article, author unknown, "Operation Iraqi Freedom: A Chronology," May 03, <a href="http://mww.ausa.org/www/army mag.nsf">http://mww.ausa.org/www/army mag.nsf</a>.

An Nasiriyah was one of the most "hotly contested" areas. The expected moral support from the Iraqi Shiites did not materialize as they "seemed to present an overall attitude of sullen indifference." Lieutenant General William Wallace, the V Corps commander, responded to the "troubling surprises" when he remarked that the Iraqis were "not the enemy we wargamed against." Strategy and tactics had to change to combat the "dynamic battlefield." One of those changes was "reducing the turn around time for fuel bearing trucks."

The Army Reserve responded by mobilizing primarily combat service and combat service support units. Army Reserve Soldiers were involved in providing military police protection, operating ports, repairing equipment, building bridges, hauling fuel, and supporting the theater on a broad-spectrum.<sup>22</sup> Army Reserve units like the Headquarters and Headquarters Detachment 362nd Quartermaster Battalion (Petroleum Supply) received mobilization orders and deployed to Kuwait and then to Iraq.

By the end of 2003, the Army Reserve had mobilized a total of 2,322 units (AA UIC's and derivative UIC's).<sup>23</sup> The total number of Army Reserve Soldiers serving on active duty for the Global War on Terrorism was 71,587 incorporating Operations Noble Eagle (home front), Enduring Freedom, and Iraqi Freedom.<sup>24</sup> Helmly described the mobilization as "for

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>21</sup>Coordinating Draft, Brown, American Military History, chapter 29, pp. 31-34.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>22</sup> Fontenot, et al., US Army in Operation Iraqi Freedom, pp. 72-73, 91.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>23</sup> Email, Sergeant First Class Charron Jones, USARC G-3 to Dr. Kathryn Roe Coker, subject: Mobilizations Stats, 8 Feb 05.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>24</sup>Battle Update Brief, USARC G-3, subject: Mobilization of Army Reserve Units and Soldiers, 30 Dec 03. This is the total Headquarters, Department of the Army mobilized Army Reserve Soldiers. There are discrepancies in the number of mobilized soldiers according to different sources. Email, Lieutenant Colonel Bill Davidson to Coker, USARC G-1, subject: Data for Historian, 27 Apr 05. According to the USARC's G-1 there were 53,555 Army Reserve Soldiers mobilized. This is the number of Soldiers who were actually being paid. Email, Colonel James Shoenhard to Coker, subject: Noble Eagle/Enduring Freedom/Iraqi Freedom RC Daily Update, 2 Mar 05. According to the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Reserve Affairs, which obtains it statistics from the G-3, the number was 89,629. That figure represents mobilization

percentage wise the largest mobilization we've had since World War II."<sup>25</sup> In a message to Army Reserve Soldiers and their families, Helmly told them: "Today the nation is asking Army Reserve Soldiers to be prepared to serve on active duty when called. Just as the generation of World War II answered the call to service, we are being called upon to sacrifice in defense of our Nation in the Global War on Terrorism."<sup>26</sup> He described 2003 as an "absolutely volatile, tumultuous year."<sup>27</sup>

Major combat operations in Iraq officially ended on 1 May 2003 when President Bush declared "mission accomplished." However, as with Operation Enduring Freedom, the insurgents were relentless. Operation Iraqi Freedom and the Global War on Terrorism continue with the nonstop mobilization and deployment of Army Reserve Soldiers. For the Headquarters and Headquarters Detachment 362nd Quartermaster Battalion (Petroleum Supply) that meant hauling fuel to support the V Corps. The V Corps along with the First Marine Expeditionary Force led the "main body attacks" into Iraq. 30

authorization -- how many members a unit is authorized to be mobilized for a given event. It does not represent people directly.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>25</sup> Interview with Lieutenant General James Helmly by Coker, 11 Mar 04.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>26</sup>News Release, Lieutenant General James Helmly, "The Army Reserve Engaged in the Global War on Terrorism," Apr 04, <a href="http://ww4.army.mil/USAR/news/word-01.php">http://ww4.army.mil/USAR/news/word-01.php</a>.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>27</sup> Interview, Helmly, 11 Mar 04.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>28</sup>Article, Kathleen Rhem, "President Bush proclaims end to major combat operations in Iraq," 2 May 03, <a href="http://www.af.mil/news/story.asp?storyID=123004771">http://www.af.mil/news/story.asp?storyID=123004771</a>.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>29</sup>Interview, Helmly, 11 Mar 04 and Article, Lieutenant General James Helmly, "The Army Reserve at War And Marching to the Future," *2003-04 Army Green Book*, p.110.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>30</sup> Fontenot, et al., US *Army in Operation Iraqi Freedom,* p. xxv.



# **Lineage and Honors**

Constituted 21 August 1944 in the Army of the United States as Headquarters and Headquarters Detachment, 4267th Quartermaster Composite Battalion

Activated 1 September 1944 in France

Reorganized and redesignated 29 March 1945 as Headquarters and Headquarters Detachment, 4267th Quartermaster Service Battalion

Inactivated 29 November 1945 at Camp Myles Standish, Massachusetts

Redesignated 21 April 1947 as Headquarters and Headquarters Detachment, 362nd Quartermaster Battalion, allotted to the Organized Reserves and assigned to the Third Army (later redesignated as the Third United States Army)

Activated 3 May 1947 at Birmingham, Alabama

Inactivated 31 December 1950 at Birmingham, Alabama

Activated 31 March 1955 at Enterprise, Alabama

Inactivated 31 January 1968 at Enterprise, Alabama

Assigned 16 April 1983 to the First United States Army and activated at Kinston, North Carolina

Relieved 1 October 1983 from assignment to the First United States Army and assigned to the Second United States Army<sup>31</sup>

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>31</sup> 362nd Quartermaster Battalion File, The US Army Institute of Heraldry and Email from Mr. Stephen Everett to Dr. Kathryn Coker, subject: 362d Quartermaster Battalion



(HHD) Petroleum Supply, 14 Jun 05. The US Army Center of Military History (CMH) reported that the unit requested a new lineage in 2004. CMH asked the unit to submit certain documentation in order to update the lineage. The action is ongoing.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>32</sup>Article, LaToya Mack, "Army Reserve Unit Earns Commendation," *Kinston Free Press*, 8 Feb 05, <a href="http://www.kinston.com">http://www.kinston.com</a> and Email w/attachment, Dr. Kathryn Coker to Major Timothy Bobroski, subject: Meritorious Unit Commendation, 10 Aug 05; and Email w/attachment, Bobroski to Coker, subject: Photos of Meritorious Unit Commendation, 12 Aug 05, Unit History File, Global War on Terrorism Historical Collection (GWOTHC), US Army Reserve Historical Research Collection (USARHRC), Office of Army Reserve History (OARH),U.S Army Reserve Command (USARC). Unless otherwise stated all information is from the Unit History File, GWOTHC, USARHRC, OARH, USARC.



# Headquarters and Headquarters Detachment 362nd Quartermaster Battalion (Petroleum Supply)

### "KEYSTONE OF MOBILITY"



### Distinctive Unit Insignia

**Description**: A gold color metal and enamel device 1 1/8 inches in height consisting of a gold-rimmed disc forming the lower part of a buff-color keystone, the disc bearing alternate wavy bands, three green with two blue between them and encircled by a blue scroll terminating on each side of the keystone with the motto, "KEYSTONE OF MOBILITY" in letters of the base metal.

**Symbolism**: The keystone, suggested by the unit's motto, is integrated with a gold wheel, symbolizing mobility, to illustrate the complete motto, "KEYSTONE OF MOBILITY." Within the wheel are contained alternate wavy bands of green and ultramarine blue, which symbolize oil and water

respectively. Water and petroleum products, which are provided by the unit, are essential to survival on the battlefield. The color buff refers to the Quartermaster Corps.

**Background**: The distinctive unit insignia was approved on 18 April 1984.



**Coat of Arms** 

### Blazon:

**Shield**: Buff, a wheel Or, surmounted by a keystone Celeste, on a chief per fess wavy Sable and Azure a mural crown of the second detailed black.

**Crest**: That for the regiments and separate battalions of the Army Reserve: From a wreath Or and Buff, the Lexington Minute Man Proper. The statue of the Minute Man, Captain John Parker (H.H. Kitson, sculptor), stands on the Common in Lexington, Massachusetts.

**Motto**: KEYSTONE OF MOBILITY

### Symbolism:

**Shield**: The keystone, suggested by the unit's motto, is integrated with a gold wheel, symbolizing mobility, to illustrate the complete motto, "KEYSTONE OF MOBILITY." Above the wheel, in chief, are alternating wavy bands of black and ultramarine blue surmounted by a

mural crown, the bands symbolizing oil and water respectively. The color buff refers to the Quartermaster Corps.

**Crest**: The crest is that of the US Army Reserve.

**Background**: The coat of arms were approved effective 16 September 1997. It was amended to correct the symbolism of the shield on 7 August 2003.

### **Command Group**

Commander Lieutenant Colonel Donald Smith

Battalion XO Major Timothy Bobroski

### Organizational Structure for Operation Iraqi Freedom

and Headquarters Detachment The Headquarters 362nd Quartermaster Battalion (Petroleum Supply) is located in Kinston, North Carolina. In peacetime the battalion organizationally falls under the 171st Area Support Group (ASG) from Garner, North Carolina. command's higher headquarters is the 81st Regional Readiness Command in Birmingham, Alabama. The battalion's wartime higher command is the 49th Quartermaster Group (Petroleum and Water) from Fort Lee, Virginia. The 49th is one of only two units of its kind in the Department of Defense being comprised of active, Army Reserve, and National Guard Soldiers. The battalion's commander from 10 July 2002 to 2005 was Lieutenant Colonel Donald Smith. Fifty-six Soldiers deployed for Operation Iraqi The following units fell under the battalion during its deployment:

2222nd Transportation Company	Tucson, Arizona
(National Guard)	
233rd Transportation Company	Philadelphia, Pennsylvania
353rd Transportation Company	Buffalo, Montana
360th Transportation Company	Fort Carson, Colorado
416th Transportation Company	Hunter Army Airfield,
	Georgia
425th Transportation Company	Salinas, Kansas
946th Transportation Company	Lewes, Delaware <sup>33</sup>

<sup>33</sup> Email, Bobroski to Coker, subject: Command Structure, 23 Jun 05 and Memorandum for Commander, Colonel Jack Vance, Commander of the 49th Quartermaster Group, to

# 362nd QUARTERMASTER BN (PS) 81st RRC BIRMINGHAM, AL 171st ASG GARNER, NC Peacetime 49th GROUP FORT LEE, VA Wartime

Figure 1: Organizational Structure of 362nd Quartermaster Battalion (PS)<sup>34</sup>

Commander, 362nd Quartermaster Battalion, subject: Meritorious Unit Commendation, 6 Jan 05.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>34</sup> Chart, 362nd Quartermaster Battalion, subject: Organizational Structure of the 362nd Quartermaster Battalion (PS), no date.




Figure 2: Task Organization of 362nd Quartermaster Battalion (Petroleum Supply)<sup>35</sup>

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>35</sup> Chart, 362nd Quartermaster Battalion, subject: Task Organization of the 362nd Quartermaster Battalion (Petroleum Supply), no date.

### **Mission Statement**

The Headquarters and Headquarters Detachment 362nd Quartermaster Battalion (Petroleum Supply) deployed to Kuwait and then to Iraq to work with the 49th Quartermaster Group (Petroleum and Water) to manage the delivery and storage of several types of bulk petroleum products to coalition forces. In particular, the battalion provided bulk Class III to V Corps and coalition units. Bulk Class III is petroleum products (Army standard fuel, diesel, gasoline) transported by large 5,000 and 7,500 gallon tankers. The battalion also distributed petroleum products in support of humanitarian missions. <sup>36</sup>According to the commander of the 49th, Colonel Jack Vance, the 49th "was given the mandate that no coalition ground operation would slow or be delayed due to a lack of fuel." <sup>37</sup>

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>36</sup> Briefing, subject: 362nd Quartermaster Battalion (PS), no date; Unit History Report for the 362nd Quartermaster Battalion; Autobiographical Sketch of Lieutenant Colonel Donald Smith; and Autobiographical Sketch of Major Timothy Bobroski, subject: 362nd Quartermaster Battalion in OIF, no date.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>37</sup> Memorandum for Record, Colonel Jack Vance to Commander, 362nd Quartermaster Battalion, subject: Meritorious Unit Commendation, 7 Jan 05.

# Chronology

25 January 2003	Battalion commander and XO are alerted for possible mobilization while attending a conference at the 81st Regional Readiness Command.		
27 January 2003	Battalion receives alert order.		
1 February 2003	Battalion receives mobilization order from Headquarters, First US Army in support of Operation Enduring Freedom. <sup>38</sup>		
3 February 2003	Battalion is mobilized.		
3 -5 February 2003	Battalion prepares for deployment at the Army Reserve Center in Kinston, North Carolina.		
6 February 2003	Battalion reports to power projection platform, Fort Bragg, North Carolina.		
3 March 2003	Battalion receives corrected mobilization order with unit roster attached from Headquarters, XVIII Airborne Corps and		

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<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>38</sup> Briefing, subject: 362nd Quartermaster Battalion (PS), no date; Unit History Report for the 362nd Quartermaster Battalion; Autobiographical Sketch of Smith; and Autobiographical Sketch of Bobroski, subject: 362nd Quartermaster Battalion in OIF, no date; and Permanent Order 032-14, Headquarters, First US Army, subject: Mobilization of 362nd Quartermaster Battalion, 1 Feb 03.

	Command's area of responsibility. <sup>39</sup>				
21 March 2003	Ground war begins. <sup>40</sup>				
8 April 2003	Battalion deploys to Camp Arifjan, Kuwait. <sup>41</sup>				
24 April 2003	Battalion commander issues warning order for the battalion to relocate to a base in southeastern Iraq no later than 30 April 2003 to forward position units to establish a tactical petroleum terminal (TPT) in the vicinity of Baghdad. <sup>42</sup>				
21 April 2003	Battalion begins the first reconnaissance trip into Iraq reaching its base in southeastern Iraq.				
22 April 2003	Advance party drives through a logistics base in south central Iraq to a logistics support activity, 30 miles south of Baghdad.				

Fort Bragg assigning it to Central

<sup>39</sup> Unit History Report for the 362nd Quartermaster Battalion, Autobiographical Sketch of Smith; Autobiographical Sketch of Bobroski, subject: 362nd Quartermaster Battalion in OIF, no date; and Permanent Order 062-327, Headquarters, XVIII Airborne Corps and Fort Bragg, subject: Mobilization Order for 362nd Quartermaster Battalion (corrected) with Unit Roster, 3 Mar 03.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>40</sup>Fontenot, et al., US Army in Operation Iraqi Freedom, p. 91.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>41</sup>Unit History Report for the 362nd Quartermaster Battalion; Autobiographical Sketch of Smith; and Autobiographical Sketch of Bobroski, subject: 362nd Quartermaster Battalion in OIF.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>42</sup> Unit History Report for the 362nd Quartermaster Battalion; Autobiographical Sketch of Smith; Autobiographical Sketch of Bobroski, subject: 362nd Quartermaster Battalion in OIF, no date; and Warning Order 03-01, 362nd Quartermaster Battalion, subject: Relocation to Southeastern Camp, 24 Apr 03.

22 –23 April 2003	Advance party conducts a reconnaissance of Baghdad International Airport (BAIP).				
29 April 2003	Advance party reaches a Forward Operating Base, east of Fallujah, and sets up operations.				
1 May 2003	Major combat operations in Iraq officially end when President Bush declares "mission accomplished." <sup>43</sup>				
14 May 2003	Remainder of the battalion relocates from Camp Arifjan to the forward operating base leaving a small cell in Camp Arifjan and the base in southeastern Iraq to coordinate operations.				
28 May 2003	Battalion begins move to a new base in southeastern Iraq near the previous base. <sup>44</sup>				
30 May 2003	A reconnaissance is conducted of a logistics base in central Iraq just north of Baghdad. <sup>45</sup>				
31 May 2003	Battalion completes move to the new logistics base in southeastern Iraq. 46				

<sup>43</sup>Article, Kathleen Rhem, "President Bush proclaims end to major combat operations in Iraq," 2 May 03, <a href="http://www.af.mil/news/story.asp?storyID=123004771">http://www.af.mil/news/story.asp?storyID=123004771</a>.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>44</sup> Unit History Report for the 362nd Quartermaster Battalion; Autobiographical Sketch of Smith; and Autobiographical Sketch of Bobroski, subject: 362nd Quartermaster Battalion in OIF.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>45</sup> Memorandum, Captain Kenneth Sheets, subject: Anaconda, 3 Jun 03.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>46</sup> Unit History Report for the 362nd Quartermaster Battalion; Autobiographical Sketch of Smith; and Autobiographical Sketch of Bobroski, subject: 362nd Quartermaster Battalion in OIF, no date.

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FRAGO directs the 946th Transportation Company (TC) to relocate the remainder of its unit from Arifjan to the new base in southeastern Iraq on 24 July 2003 in order to begin conducting JP8 missions on 26 July 2003.<sup>47</sup>

29 July 2003

FRAGO directs the battalion to provide Soldiers to work with the 514th Maintenance Company at Camp Arifjan to help sort Class IX (expendable repair parts) order to reduce the theater backlog from 1 to 26 August 2003. 48

31 July 2003

FRAGO directs the 946th TC to relocate all converted M915/M1062 systems (diesel to JP8) and other required mission support assets from Arifjan to the base in southeastern Iraq as soon as possible to begin conducting JP8 missions along with continuing to support the diesel missions with the remaining assets from Arifjan.<sup>49</sup>

22 August 2003

The 362nd Quartermaster Battalion is given the task to increase JP8 delivery to the north of BIAP and a logistics base in central Iraq and needs additional assets to accomplish the mission. FRAGO directs the 360th TC

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>47</sup> FRAGO 03-02, Lieutenant Colonel Smith, 362nd Quartermaster Battalion, subject: Relocation of 946th TC, 22 Jul 03.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>48</sup> FRAGO 03-04, Lieutenant Colonel Smith, 362nd Quartermaster Battalion, subject: Assistance to 514th Maintenance Company, 29 Jul 03.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>49</sup> FRAGO 03-04, Smith, 362nd Quartermaster Battalion, subject: Relocation of 946th TC, 31 Jul 05.

7 October 2003

FRAGO directs the battalion to provide Soldiers to assist the 353rd TC in the maintenance of equipment.<sup>51</sup>

8 November 2003

Battalion receives message to redeploy.<sup>52</sup>

15 to 18

Battalion redeploys to Arifjan, Kuwait.

November 2003

13 December 2003

Battalion is demobilized at Fort Bragg,

North Carolina.

2 February 2004

Effective date of battalion's

demobilization.53

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>50</sup> FRAGO 03-04, Lieutenant Colonel Smith, 362nd Quartermaster Battalion, subject: Increasing JP8 Delivery to North for BIAP and Anaconda, 22 Aug 03.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>51</sup> FRAGO 03-10-07, Lieutenant Colonel Smith, 362nd Quartermaster Battalion, subject: 353rd TC Needs Assistance, 7 Oct 03.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>52</sup> Unit History Report for the 362nd Quartermaster Battalion; Autobiographical Sketch, of Smith; Autobiographical Sketch of Bobroski, subject: 362nd Quartermaster Battalion in OIF, no date; and Message, Message from Commander 377th TSC to CDR V Corps, et; al., subject: FRAGO 768 to 377th TCS RCC OPORD 03-002/Redeployment Call Forward For Units from the Tactical Assembly Area to the Redeployment Assembly Area in Kuwait, 8 Nov 03.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>53</sup> Unit History Report for the 362nd Quartermaster Battalion; Autobiographical Sketch of Smith and Autobiographical Sketch of Bobroski, subject: 362nd Quartermaster Battalion in OIF, no date.

## **Operations**

On 25 January 2003, Headquarters and Headquarters Detachment 362nd Quartermaster Battalion (Petroleum Supply)'s commander, Lieutenant Colonel Donald Smith, and the executive officer (XO), Major Timothy Bobroski, received an alert for possible mobilization. During the scheduled drill the following weekend, the battalion received a mobilization order with a mobilization date of 3 February. From 3 through 5 February, the Soldiers were at the reserve center in Kinston, North Carolina. There the battalion focused its attention on getting the necessary equipment and Soldiers moved to Fort Bragg, the mobilization station. The Soldiers received four conexes to pack the battalion's equipment. While not packing equipment, Soldiers rotated through the battalion led Soldier readiness process. On 6 February the battalion reported to Fort Bragg. The Soldiers rotated through mandatory briefings, the formal Soldier readiness process, medical and dental checks and the central issuing facility (CIF). The Soldiers went to the ranges to qualify on assigned weapons.<sup>54</sup> Smith would later comment, "In retrospect I should have also qualified with an M16 since I carried one on all convoys outside the bases in Iraq besides my 9 mm pistol."55

After completing the mandatory requirements, Major Bobroski conducted military decision making process classes and finalized the Planning Standard Operating Procedures (PSOP). Along with this, the 362nd conducted hand-to-hand combat training, react to contact and react to ambush drills. The goal of this training was to better prepare the Soldiers for war. Soldiers also trained on what information was to be tracked and displayed by each section in the Tactical Operation Center (TOC). The battalion spent two months at the mobilization station before it deployed to Kuwait on 8 April 2003. The long stay at the mobilization station resulted from a change in the area of deployment. At the beginning

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>54</sup>Ibid.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>55</sup>Autobiographical Sketch of Smith, subject: 362nd Quartermaster Battalion in OIF, no date.

of its mobilization, the 362nd was to deploy to Turkey. As noted previously, Turkey would not allow US forces to enter the country. As a result, the battalion deployed to Kuwait.

The forward operating base was in Arifjan, Kuwait. Once there the 362nd assumed control of the 353rd Transportation Company (TC) and the 425th TC. The battalion made contact with the 49th Quartermaster Group and coordinated its task organization. The battalion's final task organization consisted of six 7.5K transportation companies and one petroleum supply quartermaster company totaling three hundred and sixty 7,500 gallon tankers. The battalion began moving fuel from Arifjan to a base located near An Nasiriyah in southeast Iraq. The hurriedly constructed base was south of Tallil Air Force Base on the west side of MSR (Main Supply Route) Tampa. While in Kuwait, the battalion staff made several day trips to Camp Doha, Camp Virginia, and Camp Udairi to coordinate with different units including the 240th Quartermaster Battalion. That battalion operated two bulk fuel sites in Kuwait. The 109th Quartermaster Company set up those sites.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>56</sup>Unit History Report for the 362nd Quartermaster Battalion; Autobiographical Sketch of Smith; Autobiographical Sketch of Bobroski, subject: 362nd Quartermaster Battalion in OIF, no date; and Email, Bobroski to Coker, subject: 362nd Battalion Operations in OIF, 23 Jun 05.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>57</sup> Unit History Report for the 362nd Quartermaster Battalion; Autobiographical Sketch of Smith; Autobiographical Sketch of Bobroski, subject: 362nd Quartermaster Battalion in OIF, no date; and Email, Bobroski to Coker, subject: 362nd Battalion Operations in OIF, 23 Jun 05.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>58</sup> Article, Specialist Petersi Liu, "Life Gets Better For Soldiers in Southern Iraq," no date, <a href="http://www.defendamerica.mil/articles/oct2003/al100303a.html">http://www.defendamerica.mil/articles/oct2003/al100303a.html</a>; Email, Coker to Bobroski, subject: Location of Camp Cedar, 8 Aug 05; and Email, Bobroski to Coker, subject: Location of Camp Cedar, 8 Aug 05.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>59</sup> Unit History Report for the 362nd Quartermaster Battalion; Autobiographical Sketch of Smith; Autobiographical Sketch of Bobroski, subject: 362nd Quartermaster Battalion in OIF, no date, and Email, Bobroski to Coker, subject: 362nd Battalion Operations in OIF, 23 Jun 05. For more information on the 240th Quartermaster Battalion see Article, MSG Gary Parsons, "Operation Iraqi Freedom Bulk Petroleum Distribution-'Proud to Serve' Style," no date, <a href="http://www.quartermaster.army.mil/oqmg/Professional">http://www.quartermaster.army.mil/oqmg/Professional</a>.

On 24 April 2003, Smith issued a warning order to forward position units to the camp in southeastern Iraq no later than 30 April in preparation of establishing a tactical petroleum terminal in the vicinity of Baghdad. This would cut the move in half and better prepare the battalion to move units into the Baghdad area. In the meantime, the battalion was to provide "continuous and seamless" bulk fuel support to V Corps. The pivotal tasks included the incremental deployment of battalion units as "flatbed transportation assets from the 377th Theater Support Command [an Army Reserve unit] became available and units quickly setting up and becoming operational upon arrival . . . at the base in southeastern Iraq." 60

The 49th Quartermaster Group directed the 362nd's commander to make a reconnaissance of the first location the 49th wanted the battalion to set up. That location was a logistical support area (LSA) some thirty miles south of Baghdad. Smith selected four Soldiers, including Bobroski, to make the first formal reconnaissance into Iraq. On 21 April the advance party made it through Navistar, a truck stop on the Kuwait/Iraq border, to the base in southeastern Iraq. Two commanders, Captain Richard Murray from the 425th TC and Captain Keith Barta from the 353rd TC, along with one company XO, First Lieutenant Carmelo Madera, from the 110th Quartermaster Battalion, joined the reconnaissance team for additional expertise. They slept at the base and on 22 April drove through a fueling station in central Iraq to a logistics support activity, thirty miles south of Baghdad, and conducted a reconnaissance of the base. They met with the 3rd Infantry Division (V Corps) rear TOC, which was in charge of the logistics support activity south of Baghdad. The 3rd Infantry Division informed the Soldiers that they could not deploy within the base but instead must set up operations on the east side of the base near the uncleared town of Iskandaria. The logistics support activity had enemy activity surrounding it, high power lines next to the temporary fuel farm, poor roads for the battalion's tankers, and was not defendable.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>60</sup> Warning Order 03-01, Lieutenant Colonel Donald Smith, subject: 362d Relocate to Cedar, 24 Apr 03 and ANNEX AA, Lieutenant Colonel Smith, subject: Unit movement, no date.

Meanwhile, the 425th TC and the 353rd TC had begun to push out fuel from their base in southeastern Iraq to the logistics support activity before they had a chance to recon the base for setting up a bulk class III fixed site.

Later that day on 22 April, the advance party proceeded to BIAP (Baghdad International Airport) to conduct reconnaissance of sites there. They had to travel on back roads due to an enemy ambush on the primary route. Since they had no maps of their own, the reconnaissance team had to use the 3rd Infantry Division's planning map to plot grids and load them into their Global Positioning Satellite System (GPS). Traveling on the back roads was dangerous since no military police were on that route. There was always the possibility of being ambushed or captured. Once at BIAP, the Soldiers made a reconnaissance of two main sites and returned on 23 April to Arifjan. They brought back information on those locations to Lieutenant Colonel Donna Shaw, the 49th Quartermaster Group Petroleum Operations (POLOPS) officer. The advance party advised her that BIAP was a feasible site and that logistical support activity Elm should not be used for long-term petroleum storage and distribution. On 27 April Shaw directed Smith and the reconnaissance team to travel to BIAP and secure some land so that the 362nd could set up operations.

On 28 April the second reconnaissance team traveled from Arifjan to the fuelling station in south central Iraq. Once there the advance party learned that the plans had changed. The new plans diverted them to a train station at a base east of Fallujah. They made it to this site on 29 April. The Soldiers conducted a reconnaissance for a possible tactical petroleum terminal site.

The advance party found two possible sites, but they were not the standard size. The Soldiers decided on a location that allowed them to use the available roads. The tactical petroleum terminal site was to be 900 meters long by 150 meters wide. The other site reconned was too close to a stockpile of several hundred rockets located on the north side of the rail yard. The large stockpile of ammunition was indicative of an Iraqi ammunition supply/distribution point. The night they arrived at the base, the 82nd Airborne Division (V Corps) engaged the enemy at Fallujah,

which was five to seven miles from the battalion. Thirteen Iraqi's were killed and seventy-five wounded. The battalion was forced to continually operate in this virtual "hotbed." Night tracers and explosions were the norm. As Helmly explained in a Welcome Home Warrior Citizen ceremony held on 7 July 2005 in Washington, DC, for the most part the Army Reserve supplies support services, but on today's battlefield there are no front lines. "Every convoy," he stated, "is a combat operation - there are no safe rear areas." He reiterated that statement the following day at a ceremony held at the US Army Reserve Command in Atlanta, Georgia. 62

These conditions, together with incidents of vandalism and theft along the pipeline trace, 63 did not thwart the 362nd Quartermaster Battalion from accomplishing its mission. The battalion set up operations with the 233rd TC and later with the 416th TC and with a small component of the 360th TC. The battalion's transportation companies began delivering fuel from the base in southeastern Iraq to the forward operating base east of Fallujah where fuel was picked up and distributed to BIAP and a logistics support activity north of Baghdad near the town of Balad. 64 The logistics support activity was a large US base which spread over fifteen square miles. 65

Meanwhile the battalion's staff made several trips to BIAP and to south central Iraq in an effort to coordinate support for the site. Improving

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<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>61</sup> Unit History Report for the 362nd Quartermaster Battalion; Autobiographical Sketch of Smith and Autobiographical Sketch of Bobroski, subject: 362nd Quartermaster Battalion in OIF, no date.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>62</sup> Article, Mr. Al Schilf, "Army Reserve Soldiers Returning Home From Iraq and Afghanistan Receive 'Welcome Home Warrior-Citizen,' Honor," 7 Jul 05,

http://www.armyreserve.army.mil/usar/news/2005-07-7 and Statement, Lieutenant General James Helmly, subject: Welcome Home Warrior Citizen Ceremony, 8 Jul 05.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>63</sup> FRAGO #07-06-03 #1, Lieutenant Colonel Walsh, 240th Quartermaster Battalion (Forward), subject: Vandalism, 7 Jun 03.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>64</sup>Unit History Report for the 362nd Quartermaster Battalion; Autobiographical Sketch of Smith; and Autobiographical Sketch of Bobroski, subject: 362nd Quartermaster Battalion in OIF, no date.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>65</sup>Article, Anonymous, "Camp Anaconda/KSA Anaconda," no date, <a href="http://www.arcor-rc.com/anaconda.htm">http://www.arcor-rc.com/anaconda.htm</a>.

force protection of the site was an ongoing struggle. Before the battalion's main body arrived, Soldiers from the 362nd set up a 800,000 gallon fuel system supply point (FSSP) there and transferred several million gallons of Army standard fuel (JP8) and motor gasoline (MOGAS) by way of trailer-to-trailer transfer and FSSP operations. The battalion set up the TOC on the front side of the train station at the forward operating base since it needed to be juxtaposed near a signal unit. 66 The 335th Theater Signal Command provided area signal support for theater level units and main supply routes (MSRs) located behind the corps area of operation.<sup>67</sup> DSN and Non-Secure Internet Protocol Router (NIPR) access established the communications needed to coordinate battalion operations before the main body arrived at the forward operating base east of Fallujah. Operation Iraqi Freedom was the first time the battalion used the SIPRNET (Secret Internet Protocol Router Network). It proved essential in receiving timely updates about enemy activity and, along with other systems, in communicating with base stations. <sup>68</sup>

On 14 May the remainder of the battalion's staff relocated from Arifjan to the forward operating base east of Fallujah. The 362nd left a small cell in Arifjan and the base in southeastern Iraq to synchronize operations. The site remained volatile as the battalion tried to execute its mission. On 10 May the V Corps' 3rd Armored Cavalry Regiment (ACR) issued an ultimatum to an Iranian faction situated in a complex some two and a half miles away. Eight Apache helicopters and a number of mechanical and armored units confronted the group of Iranians. Some thirty minutes past the 3rd Cavalry Regiment's deadline the Iranians surrendered. A few days later an unknown party blew up the Iranian complex. This explosion ignited the whole complex. The explosions

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<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>66</sup> Unit History Report for the 362nd Quartermaster Battalion; Autobiographical Sketch of Smith; and Autobiographical Sketch of Bobroski, subject: 362nd Quartermaster Battalion in OIF, no date.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>67</sup> ANNEX H to OPORD, Lieutenant Colonel Smith, subject: ANNEX H (Signal) to 362nd QM BN OPORD 03-003 (Desert Sustainer), no date.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>68</sup> Unit History Report for the 362nd Quartermaster Battalion; Autobiographical Sketch of Smith; and Autobiographical Sketch of Bobroski, subject: 362nd Quartermaster Battalion in OIF, no date.

went on for four hours. The battalion's Soldiers had to don flak vests and helmets for most of the day. In another incident the site came under a nuclear biological chemical (NBC) scare. All Soldiers went into MOPP4. The battalion was under constant mortar and direct fire threats. This forced the unit to change operations toward the end of its stay there by moving all the tankers to a protected walled site some three miles away. The battalion learned later that a unit of the 3rd ACR assumed control of the site which was attacked by rocket-propelled grenade (RPG) and small arms fire three days after the 362nd left.

Throughout May, the forward operating base continued to receive intelligence reports about insurgent attacks. The battalion, however, continued to transfer fuel from there until late in May. The 362nd learned that the transportation units at the base were planning on relocating to another more defensible base. That action would leave the 362nd Quartermaster Battalion virtually by itself at the base. Because of the mounting enemy threat, the upcoming departure of several units, and the lack of defense, the battalion began to coordinate with the 49th Quartermaster Group to move south and establish operations at the camp in southeastern Iraq near An Nasiriyah. This base, some fifteen to twenty miles from the original base, was still in the concept stage. It was not easy to gain approval of firm plans. After receiving tentative approval, on 27 May the battalion started moving the dry transportation units. As units departed, it became even more arduous to defend the remaining units.

The old location, according to Lieutenant Colonel Myron Fronseca, commander of the 260th Quartermaster Battalion, an active duty unit from Hunter Army Airfield, Georgia, collocated at the convoy pit stop there with the 362nd, "was a dust bowl, nothing but a dust bowl." The strong winds and "fine, loose grit caused by" the steady heavy truck traffic resulted in visibility and equipment concerns. As Fronseca explained, "So engineers looked for a more suitable site based on geographical and

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>69</sup>Ibid; Article, "Tallil Airbase Sector Operations Center Intecept Operations Center," no date, <a href="http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/wordl/iraq/tallil.htm">http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/wordl/iraq/tallil.htm</a>; and Email, Coker to Bobroski, subject: Location of Camp Cedar, 8 Aug 05.

tactical considerations as a permanent camp for years to come. They found it fifteen kilometers to the north, near Tallili Air Base."<sup>70</sup>

By 31 May the entire battalion reached this base and moved quickly to reestablish its operations. The 362nd began delivering fuel daily to a logistics base activity in central Iraq and to BIAP. In July the 946th TC relocated the remainder of its unit from Arifjan to the new base. In August the battalion had to increase its JP8 delivery. The 360th TC relocated a platoon and other mission support assets from Arifjan to the base. The 362nd continued to perform its basic mission until the 260th Quartermaster Battalion (PS) ceased its operations in late October. Then in addition to its normal operations, the battalion began delivering fuel to coalition units located below Baghdad. Daily operations included making certain the battalion was adequately resourcing its subordinate units and keeping abreast of the fuel mission status.<sup>71</sup>

The battalion remained at the base until redeploying to Arifjan from 15 to 18 November 2003. During its stay at this base, the battalion developed an overall base defense plan to include a barrier plan and a course of action for base and tenant units. The 362nd developed a redeployment matrix and checklist, which made the redeployment process easier.<sup>72</sup>

The welfare of the Soldiers was always on the mind of the commander and others in the battalion. Smith voiced the concern that some of the Soldiers might develop Leishmaniasis. "The sand flies would bite us all the time especially during the summer months. Several

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>70</sup> Article, Specialist Petersi Liu, "Life Gets Better For Soldiers in Southern Iraq," Oct 2003, http://www.defendamerica.mil/articles/oct2003/al00303a.html.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>71</sup> Unit History Report for the 362nd Quartermaster Battalion; Autobiographical Sketch of Smith; and Autobiographical Sketch of Bobroski, subject: 362nd Quartermaster Battalion in OIF, no date.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>72</sup>Unit History Report for the 362nd Quartermaster Battalion; Autobiographical Sketch of Smith; and Autobiographical Sketch of Bobroski, subject: 362nd Quartermaster Battalion in OIF, no date.

personnel were evacuated to Walter Reed Medical Center in Washington, DC."<sup>73</sup>

One of the major challenges which faced the 362nd and not completely overcome was trying to obtain more equipment needed for convoy escort and security. On 16 July 2003, Smith sent a memorandum to the commander of the 49th Quartermaster Group in Arifjan, Kuwait, requesting "additional assets to help self secure its convoys . . . . This was in lieu of recent increases in enemy ambushes along the routes that the battalion vehicles travel, which have resulted in two fatalities from other battalions that deliver to BIAP and . . . [the log base] in central Iraq." Due to a lack of resources, the military police were unable to escort the battalion's fuel convoys. "Currently," Smith continued, "the battalion does not have any vehicle-mounted machine guns. We have just received five M6 pedestal mounts that are currently being attached to HMMWVs. The battalion has been sending one HMMMV with each convoy; however it does not have much firepower." He explained that the battalion had "developed a plan to self-secure convoys. . . . To accomplish this standard of self-protection," he detailed the equipment needed for "machine mounted HMMWVs and the personnel manning them."<sup>74</sup>

Instead of allowing the convoys to move out unprotected, the battalion devised an internal convoy escort and security force using its "organic" HMMWVs. But dissimilar from military police HMMWVs, the battalion's vehicles were not armored and they did not have ring mounts for its MK19s, M2s, or M249s. The 362nd was unable to obtain additional HMMWV's with machine gun mounts, more Single Channel Ground and Airborne Radio System (SINCGARS) radios for convoy communications, or interceptor body armor for security vehicle Soldiers. The battalion was finally able to obtain locally fabricated machinegun

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>73</sup> Ibid. Leishmaniasis is a parasitic disease spread by the bite of infected sand flies. About 22 cases were reported in military personnel who deployed during 2002 and 2003 to Afghanistan, Kuwait, and Iraq. "Leishmanissis," no date,

http://www.cdc.gov/ncidod/dpd/parasites/leishmania/factsht and "Leishmanissis," no date, http://www.cdc.gov/mmwr/preview/mmwrhtml/mm5242al.htm.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>74</sup> Memorandum For Commander, 49th Quartermaster Group, Lieutenant Colonel Smith, subject: Equipment needed to self-secure battalion convoys, 16 Jul 03.

pedestal mounts from the 171st ASG. The battalion mounted them on 12 of the escort HMMWVs.<sup>75</sup>

The battalion also set up a training program to provide an escort and security force. Soldiers assigned to the force received weapons training, classroom training on escort procedures, enemy prisoner of war search procedures, and on-the-job training with the 607th Military Police Battalion. According to Smith, ". . . [T]his program will provide our soldiers with discipline, confidence, and esprit de corps. This will enhance the overall force protection of our convoys."

Another issue was getting the convoys off the dirt section of the main supply route in Iraq. In June theater headquarters decided the alternate supply route (ASR) was too treacherous for travel and commanded all traffic to take a dirt portion of the MSR northward which bypassed the ASR. Yet not one of the battalion's many convoys had been attacked or ambushed on the portion of the ASR it had traveled. This southern segment of the MSR that bypassed the ASA, was an improved dirt road. The equipment of the 7,500 gallon tanker companies was not intended to travel off road. The equipment suffered and consequently the battalion's operational readiness rate fell from the low 80th percentile to nearly 40 percent. Most of the damage done to the equipment was a direct result of crossing the dirt portion of the MSR. There was a considerable loss of tires. Before the decision was made to use the dirt portion of the MSR, the loss of tires on one mission ranged from two to three. By traveling on the dirt portion of the road, it was not uncommon for units to lose from ten to fifteen tires on a single mission. Another problem was leaf springs. In two months the leaf springs snapped on over 100 tankers. The new route resulted in other problems such as broken transmissions and leaking front main engine seals. The maintenance section of every company struggled to keep the equipment running. Across the theater, the

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>75</sup>Unit History Report for the 362nd Quartermaster Battalion; Autobiographical Sketch of Smith; and Autobiographical Sketch of Bobroski, subject: 362nd Quartermaster Battalion in OIF, no date.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>76</sup>Memorandum for Distribution, Lieutenant Colonel Smith, subject: Convoy Escort/Security Training, 16 Sep 03.

class IX repair parts system was essentially broken. Working through the 49th Quartermaster Group, the 362nd persuaded U.S Army Forces, Central Command (ARCENT)<sup>77</sup> to let traffic move around the dirt section of MSR Tampa. This decision took almost two months resulting in "an astronomic toll" on the battalion's equipment.<sup>78</sup> It also contributed to the death of one Soldier.<sup>79</sup>

Another challenge was communications given the expansive theater of operations.<sup>80</sup> Critical to the mission was maintaining communications between the forward operating base east of Fallujah and the remainder of the battalion at Arifjan, a distance of over 500 miles. While in theater the battalion received two new communication systems, the mobile tracking system (MTS) and the HARRIS radio. While at the forward operating base, the only way to communicate was to use MTS in the recon vehicle. These two systems were pivotal to mission success in that they made it possible for the battalion to communicate with the base stations. MTS could track each vehicle convoy from anywhere on the battlefield. MTS provided limited email with the battalion TOC which helped significantly with MEDVAC. The Global Positioning Satellite System (GPS) was vital especially given the distance on the battlefield and want of maps. The battalion bought a civilian GPS. Due to a lack of updated non-secure voice telephones, the battalion borrowed telephones from a signal unit. Fortunately the battalion deployed with its own computer network server and hubs to establish a capable network system.<sup>81</sup> Initially the Internet was indispensable in communicating with

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<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>77</sup>Unit History Report for the 362nd Quartermaster Battalion; Autobiographical of Smith; and Autobiographical Sketch of Bobroski, subject: 362nd Quartermaster Battalion in OIF, no date.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>78</sup> Ibid.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>79</sup> Email, Bobroski to Coker, subject: 362nd Quartermaster OIF, 6 Jul 05.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>80</sup> ANNEX H to OPORD, Lieutenant Colonel Smith, subject: ANNEX H (Signal) to 362nd QM BN OPORD 03-003 (Desert Sustainer), no date.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>81</sup> Unit History Report for the 362nd Quartermaster Battalion; Autobiographical Sketch of Smith; Autobiographical Sketch of Bobroski, subject: 362nd Quartermaster Battalion in Operation OIF, no date; and Email, Bobroski to Coker, subject: 362nd Battalion Operations in OIF, 23 Jun 03.

higher headquarters and other units located in various areas. Electronic files were used to send information in and out of theater.<sup>82</sup> heat, often reaching over 140 degrees, played havoc with the electronic equipment. At first the battalion used computer disks, but discovered they were operational for no more than two days. In the summer months, printers operated for about a month. Besides using the Internet, the only way to transfer files was to use the durable memory sticks.<sup>83</sup> According to Captain Elizabeth Russell, "Use of a scanner was essential in preservation of records and historical information."84

In the end, Headquarters and Headquarters Detachment 362nd Quartermaster Battalion (Petroleum Supply) successfully accomplished its mission. The battalion delivered 61 million gallons of JP8, 6.6 million gallons of DF2 (diesel), 3.3 million gallons of MOGAS, and 124,000 gallons of water. The battalion drove a total of 9.2 million miles. 85 As Captain Keith Archibald wrote in an autobiographical sketch of his experience in theater, "Our missions were such that nearly 100% of the operational trucks had to be on the road to meet requirements. Essentially, we could barely keep up with the warfighter's thirst for fuel."86

In recognition of a job well done, in February 2005 the 362nd, as aligned under the 49th Quartermaster Group, was awarded the Meritorious Unit Commendation, the Army's second highest unit award. The citation read in part: "The 49th Quartermaster Group's success in providing bulk petroleum and water to all Coalition Forces by establishing an inland petroleum distribution system with over 220 miles of pipeline, constructing the largest tactical storage site in the history of mechanized warfare, conducting the Humanitarian Assistance Task Force mission in

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>82</sup> Autobiographical Sketch of Captain Elizabeth Russell, subject: 362nd Quartermaster Battalion in OIF, no date.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>83</sup> Autobiographical Sketch of Captain Keith Archibald, subject: 362nd Quartermaster Battalion in OIF, no date.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>84</sup> Autobiographical Sketch of Captain Russell, subject: 362 Quartermaster Battalion in OIF, no date.

<sup>85</sup> Email, Bobroski to Coker, subject: 362nd QM Stats, 28 Jun 05.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>86</sup> Autobiographical Sketch, Captain Keith Archibald, Subject: 362nd Quartermaster in OIF, no date.

support of Task Force Restore Iraqi Oil and transporting over 326 million gallons of fuel to Coalition Forces in austere and hostile conditions was unprecedented."<sup>87</sup> The presenter of the award to the 362nd remarked, "Your battalion and companies underneath you . . . played a very significant part for our nation to accomplish what we accomplished. You did it for all the right reasons - for a nation and a nation's people to stand on their . . . [own] and have a free nation as we have today."<sup>88</sup>

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>87</sup>Citation, Department of the Army, subject: 49th Quartermaster Group Meritorious Unit Commendation, no date.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>88</sup> Article, LaToya Mack, "Army Reserve Unit Earns Commendation," Kinston Free Press, <a href="http://www.kinston.com">http://www.kinston.com</a>, 8 Feb 05.

#### **Lessons Learned and Sustained Actions**

From its mobilization, deployment, and redeployment, the 362nd Quartermaster Battalion gained experience in many areas of operation and became aware of problems hindering the mission and those that fostered mission success. As a result, Major Elizabeth Kuhl, the S2/3, identified a number of issues and lessons learned along with sustained actions.

According to Kuhl, the battalion needs to acquire more maps for its subordinate units to use for their convoys. The 362nd was unaware of its area of operations in Iraq before deploying. As noted previously, the battalion initially was to deploy to Turkey. This change in the mission occurred just before deployment. The battalion acquired one set of maps from Fort Bragg's map warehouse. They were the wrong size. Soldiers used 1:50,000 maps for annual training but had to use 1:250,000 maps in theater.<sup>89</sup> Due to the scarcity of maps, when the 362nd reached the theater it could only acquire one map for the headquarters and its subordinate units. As a result, convoys went into Iraq without any maps. Kuhl recommended that the battalion needs to obtain 1:250,000 series maps for the deployed area of operations. The headquarters needs to presume that seven companies will be under its command. maps should be available for those units. If feasible, there should be a contact point for maps at the mobilization station and in theater. Upon arrival, the battalion needs to posses a 1687 signature card and assumption of command orders on-hand to give the theater warehouse. The command should conduct research and order suitable software to assist in map designing and terrain features. Fortunately, the battalion did have GPS equipment.

Kuhl was concerned over security clearances. Soldiers in the security and plans section did not have a good idea on which security clearances had been submitted or their processing stage. They also did not

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>89</sup>Memorandum For Record, Major Elizabeth Kuhl, subject: AAR Comments, 29 Nov 03.

have expertise in using the Defense Security System (DSS) for clearance data. The unit administrator had to process all security clearances. Unfortunately the unit administrator did not deploy thereby handicapping securing security clearances. Kuhl recommended that troop program unit Soldiers manage all security clearance actions in the Security and Plans Section which would foster the battalion's groundwork for future deployments.

Kuhl believed laboratory testing with the Air Force and fuel training with other labs in theater was another area of consternation. The lab section had to perform static discharge additive (SDA) tests while at the forward operating base east of Fallujah but did not have the needed test kit. The battalion coordinated with Air Force lab personnel to conduct the necessary tests. Air Force personnel were helpful. Battalion Soldiers also met and shared information with lab personnel from the 240th Quartermaster Battalion at Camp Virginia and the 418th Quartermaster Battalion at Anaconda. The 362nd carried out tests for the 418th Quartermaster Battalion's lab when that unit's lab was "inoperable." This provided additional training for the 362nd's Soldiers. Kuhl recommended that lab personnel get together with other lab technicians from all the armed forces operating in the area and build a good communications and a support system.

Continuing her after action report, Kuhl stated that the battalion's sections must pinpoint the equipment needed during deployment. Sections took unnecessary equipment that had not been correctly inventoried, cleaned, and tagged. The section's noncommissioned officer should use the hand receipt as an aid in earmarking what equipment is needed for deployment. The section should tag and label the equipment needed for deployment along with maintaining its condition. Small ISU 90 containers for "accountability and section equipment management" should be obtained.

Kuhl was also concerned about training. The battalion expected to be at the mobilization station for two weeks. After mobilization, the battalion had to develop a training plan separate from the one included in the Post-Mobilization Training Plan (PRSR). Its PRSR was for two weeks

of mandatory training. As stated previously, the battalion was instead at the mobilization station for over two months and had to develop a training schedule for that time period. Kuhl suggested that the battalion develop a plan enumerating and prioritizing training to be accomplished and include other training needed to ready Soldiers for potential combat situations "such as hand to hand combat, cold or hot weather conditions, urban warfare, or other environments. . . ."

As the battalion's commander pointed out, Soldiers should be qualified on the weapons to be used in theater.<sup>91</sup> Weapons needed to be cleaned and lubricated. The battalion had significant problems with magazines, which did not operate well because of the heat and dust. The most problematic one was the 9 mm magazine. The commander advised that the magazine should be redesigned.<sup>92</sup>

Another lesson learned related to additional duty assignments. The battalion had no Soldiers qualified in hazardous material (HAZMAT) and none qualified as a unit movement officer (UMO). Few were combat lifesaver certified before deployment. The battalion was unable to get Soldiers HAZMAT qualified. This caused problems in shipping equipment and MILVANs to and from the theater. Kuhl suggested that a number of Soldiers needed to be trained in necessary additional duties.

Kuhl reported a success story related to the redeployment checklist. The battalion designed a redeployment checklist for the individual staff sections to aid the units in redeployment procedures. The "checklist helped to ensure actions were not overlooked or forgotten when redeploying." She recommended that the redeployment checklist be continued and "expand[ed] on as needed."

Months before deployment the battalion's units had the chance to update their computers into the Transportation Coordinator Automated

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>90</sup> Memorandum For Record, Major Kuhl, subject: AAR Comments, 29 Nov 03.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>91</sup> Autobiographical Sketch of Smith, no date, subject: 362nd Quartermaster Battalion in OIF, no date.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>92</sup>Ibid, Unit History Report for the 362 Quartermaster Battalion and Autobiographical Sketch of Bobroski, subject: 362nd Quartermaster Battalion in OIF, no date.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>93</sup> Memorandum For Record, Major Kuhl, subject: AAR Comments, 29 Nov 03.

Command and Control Information System (TCACCIS). Consequently they were able to redeploy quicker and more competently. Kuhl suggested that soon after units are in theater Soldiers should set aside a time to input their unit equipment into the TCACCIS aimed at improving preparations for redeployment.<sup>94</sup>

The junior noncommissioned officers presented informative briefings to the battalion commander, unit commanders and unit first sergeants. The "internal issue brief," along with command and staff briefs, kept all informed and maintained open lines of communication.

The TOC shift schedules were successful. Soldiers "knew where to be" and what to do. The junior noncommissioned officers and two staff sergeants operated the TOC with little or no oversight. Kuhl advised that the noncommissioned officers need to remain assertive in the TOC. However, "supervision of generator maintenance and services" should be upgraded.

Kuhl believed that "A qualified LNO [liaison officer] in the Petroleum Fusion Cell improves information flow. Having a liaison officer who works directly with the Petroleum Fusion Cell puts the battalion in the decision making process. Furthermore, the LNO can improve information flow, both up and down the chain of command. That LNO can also aid in maintaining communications with Group Leadership." Officers and senior noncommissioned officers need to "understand the POL [petroleum, oils, and lubricants] mission, its requirements and the capabilities of the battalion. This will make all officers capable of performing the LNO mission. A 77F30 [petroleum specialist E6] position should be added to the MTOE [modified table of organization and equipment] as a Liaison NCO position since this is a must fill position. At a minimum, one should be authorized as excess in the event of mobilization."

The battalion held an informal weekly staff officer meeting to foster "continuity throughout the staff on all issues, to help control rumors, and to resolve issues between staff sections." The meetings, which began late in the deployment, were constructive. In Kuhl's opinion, they need to

<sup>94</sup>Ibid.

be scheduled "immediately upon deployment to eliminate rumors and to help staff sections settle issues that cannot be handled through normal day to day communications among the battalion's staff."<sup>95</sup>

First Lieutenant Billy Canterbury from the 2222nd Transportation Company (National Guard) made a number of observations in his after action review.

He determined that security requirements exceeded available resources for LSA and convoy operations. There were inadequate barriers, guard towers, and manpower for base defense. Protection against incoming mortars and artillery was nonexistent. As pointed out by the battalion's commander and the XO, convoy security was restricted to "organic resources." Military police and MSR security forces were insufficient. Canterbury recommended using the military decision making process to pinpoint lapses in coverage. rIn the long run, the modified table of organization and equipment needed to be altered to include "armored HMMWV's with gun mounts [and] ballistic vests." More Soldiers were required to provide security.

Communication was challenging given the battalion's mission to fuel V Corps units spread out across the expansive battlefield and given a poor mobile subscriber equipment (MSE) network. Command and control suffered. SINGCARS failed to effectively serve convoys and base operations. Radio maintenance was difficult. Class IX repair and replacement parts never arrived. Canterbury recommended that the "realignment of wartime trace and integrated planning would identify communication requirements." He also believed exercises with the Signal Corps would be helpful. The modified table of organization and equipment should incorporate new equipment needed.

Logistics was another problem. He adjudged the supply system to be "fundamentally inadequate to meet the needs of the battlefield." Manpower, transportation, and electronic management were deficient. The maintenance section's orders went unfilled. Using Kuwait as the conduit for supplying needed equipment in Iraq was inefficient. He

<sup>95</sup> Ibid.


recommended making "better use of contract outsourcing for basic needs [and] . . . Army preposition stock . . . and wartime stocks [which] should be increased to meet the demands on the battlefield."

Canterbury stated information such as "commanders' intent and restated missions" did not percolate down to the company level. In most cases, the lack of understanding caused the force to be reactionary instead of transformational. He believed the units entered "into the area of operations without the adequate maps and intelligence." He recommended to "integrate each information management system by Battle Operating System (BOS). . . [R]ealistic training such as War Fighter and/or Janus driven exercises" should be planned. He also recommended "conduct[ing] 'Military Decision Making Process . . . exercises."

Finally, Canterbury reported disconnects between the Army Reserve and the National Guard. "Assets aligned with reserve components and National Guard created limitations on commanders to fulfill mission requirements. The logistical, medical, and personnel management systems complicated the Army Reserve and National Guard units to properly man and support missions. "The current system inherently creates a great divide amongst the army components." The company arrived in theater at 80 percent strength. Replacements were supposed to be on hand but were never realized. "The current [personnel management] system did not provide for one single shortage including critical Military Occupational Skill (MOS) vacancies. The medical system did not process medical issues on a timely basis." As a result, Soldiers could be on medical hold for as long as five months. Canterbury's recommendation was to "revamp the war time trace and personnel management system to accommodate future deployments."96

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>96</sup>Memorandum for Record, First Lieutenant Billy Canterbury, subject: After Action Review, Oct 03.

# Soldier's Creed/Warrior Ethos



#### From A Soldier's Perspective

"Sheer will power did . . . the work. Constant communication and bartering for services or resources [was] needed in order to accomplish all missions."

"Basically I did what I did by knowing the fuel requirements and knowing the amount of fuel each tanker could haul individually."

"This was a life changing eye, opening experience. We've heard rumors of war, but until you've been there, seen, and done, rumors go on."

"Glad to be home in one piece."

"I feel that this deployment allowed me to grow as both a Soldier and a person. An interesting experience."

"The entire deployment was a great experience."

"Go Army! Hooah!"

"The heat was a major factor and our procedures had to change. We adapted."

"The mission required every operable POL truck to transport fuel daily."

"I attribute much of what I accomplished to my over 13 years of both TPU and AGR experience. What ever else that helped me, I can only attribute to a higher power than myself having never experienced the other

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>97</sup>Autobiographical Sketches, 362nd Quartermaster Battalion, subject: Personnel Reflections, no dates. The quotations are taken from each Soldier's autobiographical sketch.

dynamics and stresses that I experienced during the entire mobilization/deployment period."

"My mission was complete with the help of all the trans units (tankers) using computers, SINGCARS. GPS helped accomplish the mission of supporting V Corps and coalition units."

"Just stuck to the basic use of equipment. Civilian Garmin [brand of GPS] was a life saver for GPS."

"I had the chance to use my MOS and learn about the LOGSTAT reports. Experienced many situations, some good, some bad, but over all S-4 got the mission done."

"Well to do all the things I did would take all year. But, all I can say is I did by best. I had good training so it came natural."

"The mission was definitely worthwhile because everything comes to a halt if you don't have fuel." 98

<sup>98</sup>Ibid.

### **Casualties**





Sergeant Nathaniel Hart, Jr., from the 416th TC, died on 28 July 2003 while traveling in a towed M915 which overturned on the dirt portion of the main supply route.

Sergeant Jarrett Thompson, from the 946th TC, died on 30 August 2003 in a head on collision with a Iraqi tractor trailer which lost control when trying to pass a slower moving vehicle on an alternate supply road.

SPC Ryan Carlock, from the 416 TC, died on 9 September 2003 after being struck by fragments of an IED while traveling on the main supply road just west of Baghdad.<sup>99</sup>

<sup>99</sup> Email, Bobroski to Coker, subject: Casualties, 6 Jul 05.

## **Photographs**



Subject: Commo Set MTS (no air-conditioning, 140°) People: SFC Gregory

Waters

Date: 24 Aug 03



Subject: Other Half of

Commo Setup

People: CPT Elbert Hill

Date: 24 Aug 03



Subject: Satellite TV & Unit TOC Setup, Sun

Shade

People: None Date: 29 Aug 03



Subject: TOC Setup,

POLOPS

People: SSG Joseph Williams, SSG Kareen

Tripp

Date: 24 Aug 03



Subject: Original Sleep

Tents

People: None Date: 2 Aug 03



Subject: Plotting on TOC

Map

People: SGT Catherine

Collins

Date: 5 Sep 03



Subject: Standing at BIAP During Initial Recon People: CPT Dean Bundschu, MAJ Timothy Bobroski, SGT Allison North, MSG Quentin Harper Date: 21 Apr 03



Subject: Staging Line at FOB in Central Iraq

People: SSG Curtis Blount

Date: 5 Sep 03




Subject: Destroyed Iraqi

Tank


People: CPT Dean

Bundschu Date: 4 Sep 03



Subject: Sleep Tents At the Camp in Southern Iraq

People: None Date: 5 Sep 03



Subject: TOC Airconditioning
People: None
Date: 29 Aug 03



Subject: Wooden Latrines

People: None Date: 2 Aug 03



Subject: Fixing HMMWV MTS Commo System People: SFC Gregory

Waters

Date: 29 Aug 03



Subject: Front of TOC With Sun Shade

People: SFC Byron Lane

Date: 4 Oct 04



Subject: Roadside Repairs People: 416th TC Convoy

r copic. 410th 10 C

Personnel

Date: 29 Aug 03



Subject: Camel Herd Along Main Supply Route People: Iraqi Camel Herder Date: 21 Apr 03



Subject: Tankers in South Central Iraq People: None

Date: 4 October 03



Subject: Posing on Top

of Iraqi Temple People: Many Date: 2 Aug 03



Subject: Plane Over to

Kuwait

People: All HHD Date: 8 Apr 03



Subject: Security on

Convoy

People: LTC Donald Smith & SGT Gabrielle

Lloyd

Date: 5 Sep 03



Subject: Air Conditioned

Trailers

People: SSG Curtis Jones, SGT Cedrick Tyson, SSG Phyllis McCormick, SPC Harry Kimberling


Date: 25 Oct 03



Subject: Tanker to Tanker

Transfer

People: Assorted Date: 20 May 03



Subject: Loading up Tankers at FSSP People: 353rd TC Date: 3 May 03



Subject: The Remaining HHD Personnel Prior to Unit Redeployment People: HHD

Date: 30 Nov 03



Subject: S1/S4 Trailer People: CPT Russell, SFC Gregory Waters, SGT Cynthia Hicks, SGT Abdullah Hussein

Date: 25 Oct 03



Subject: Mail Operations

People: Several Bn

personnel

Date: 24 Aug 03



Subject: Bn Cdr Tent (Air

Conditioned)
People: None
Date: 15 Oct 03



Subject: 353rd Commander

by Sleeping Tents

People: CPT Keith Barta,

353nd Cdr Date: 24 Aug 03



Subject: Chapel at Camp in Southeastern Iraq People: Chaplain Delbert Minner, SGT Stacy Reim

Date: 4 Nov 03



Subject: Consolidated MWR

Tent

People: No Bn Personnel

Date: 4 Nov 03



Subject: PX at Camp in Southeastern Iraq People: PX Personnel Date: 4 Nov 03



Subject: Soldier in Iraqi Tank People: SSG Curtis Blount

Date: 24 Aug 03



Subject: Battalion TOC People: SSG Curtis Jones

Date: 29 Aug 03



Subject: Sleep Tents, Latrines, Showers and 20k Water Bag

People: None Date: 15 Sep 03



Subject: Temple on the

Road to

FOB in Central Iraq

People: None Date: 15 Oct 04

#### Acronyms

77F30 Petroleum Specialist, E6
AAR After Action Review

ACR Armored Calvary Regiment

AGR Active Guard Reserve

ARCENT US Army Forces, US Central Command

ASG Area Support Group

ASP Ammunition Supply Point ASR Alternate Supply Route

BIAP Baghdad International Airport

BN Battalion Cdr Commander

CFLCC Coalition Forces Land Component

Command

CIF Central Issuing Facility

Commo Communications
DFAC Dining Facility

FOB Forward Operating Base
FRAGO Fragmentary Order
FSC Field Service Company

FSSP Fuel System Supply Point

GPS Global Positioning Satellite System

GWOT Global War on Terrorism

HAZMAT Hazardous Material

HMMWV High-Mobility Multipurpose Wheeled

Vehicle

IED Improvised Explosive Device

JP8 Standard fuel used by vehicles, helicopters,

generators, etc. (close to diesel)

LNO Liaison Officer

LSA Logistical Support Area MOGAS Gasoline (Motor Gasoline)

MEDVAC Medical Evaluation

MOPP4 Mission Oriented Protective Posture, Level

4

MOS Military Occupational Specialty

MSR Main Supply Route

MTS Mobile Tracking System

MWR Morale, Welfare, Recreation

NBC Nuclear Biological Chemical

NIPR Non-Secure Internet Protocol Router

NLT No Later Than

OARH Office of Army Reserve History

OIF Operation Iraqi Freedom

OPORD Operational Order

POL Petroleum, Oils & Lubricants

POLOPS Petroleum Operations
PS Petroleum Supply

PSOP Planning Standard Operating Procedures

QM Quartermaster
REPOL Petroleum Report

RAA Redeployment Assembly Area

RPG Rocket-Powered Grenade

Rocket-Propelled Grenade

SDA Static Discharge Additive

SINCGARS Single Channel Ground and Airborne Radio

System

SIPRNET Secret Internet Protocol Router Network

SP Start Point

TAA Tactical Assembly Area
TC Transportation Company
TOC Tactical Operations Center
TPT Tactical Petroleum Terminal

TPU Troop Program Unit
UIC Unit Identification Code
UMO Unit Movement Officer

USARHRC United States Army Reserve Historical

**Research Collection** 

TCACCIS Transportation Coordinator Automated

Command and Control Information System







UNIVERSITY OF FLORIDA
The Global War on Terrorism Ope
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